

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 07730 01 OF 02 160629Z

10

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 124239

O R 160416Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1044

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 7730

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY

SUBJ: DELIVERY OF PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER TO DEMIREL AND
LATER TALK WITH ECEVIT

REF: STATE 244266

1. UPON RECEIPT OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE MORNING
OCTOBER 15, I REQUESTED A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.
THIS TOOK PLACE AT 5:30 P.M. IN PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE
(WHICH HE GENERALLY USES FOR MEETINGS HE WISHES THE PRESS NOT
TO LEARN OF). FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL WAS PRESENT FOR
FIRST FEW MINUTES BUT THEN HAD TO LEAVE FOR EARLIER
SCHEDULED ENGAGEMENT SO THAT FOR MOST OF THE MEETING ONLY
DEMIREL AND I WERE PRESENT. DEMIREL BEGAN BY READING
PRESIDENT'S LETTER THROUGH CAREFULLY AND THEN ASKED FOR
MY ADDITIONAL ORAL COMMENTS TO WHICH THE MESSAGE HAD
REFERRED.

2. WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS, I EMPHASIZED THE PRESIDENT'S
CONVICTION THAT THE BASIC POSITIONS OF BOTH MAKARIOS AND THE
PRESENT GREEK LEADERS IN ATHENS WERE NOT TOO DIFFERENT FROM WHAT
WE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE THINKING OF THE GOT. I NOTED TOO, THE
PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY'S CONVICTION THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT
IN ATHENS WISHES TO REACH A COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AND
IS AT PRESENT PROBABLY IN A STRONGER POSITION THAN ANY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 07730 01 OF 02 160629Z

GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN, OR WILL BE, TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH

PRESIDENT MAKARIOS. I ALSO NOTED THAT IF THE GOT NOW SHOWED FLEXIBILITY IN THE CYPRUS SITUATION IT WOULD BE DOING SO NOT RPT NOT UNDER CONGRESSIONAL DURESS. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD BE ACTING AFTER IT HAD CARRIED ITS POINT WITH CONGRESS AND AFTER THE LATTER HAD ALTERED ITS POSITION. I ALSO NOTED THE CONVICTION HELD BY THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY AND MANY CONGRESSMEN OF BOTH PARTIES THAT IF TURKEY CAME FORWARD NOW WITH WHAT OBJECTIVE THIRD PARTIES WOULD CONSIDER A REASONABLE OPENING OFFER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THIS WOULD MOVE US OUT OF THE DANGER ZONE WITH RESPECT TO A CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT TO REIMPOSE THE EMBARGO AT A LATER DATE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF TURKEY LOST ITS PRESENT CHANCE, SUCH LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS WERE LIKELY AND THEN WE WOULD BE ONCE MORE IN THE SITUATION WHERE TURKEY WOULD APPEAR TO BE PRESSED TO ACT AGAIN UNDER DURESS. I SAID THAT I RECOGNIZED THAT FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES THE GREEKS WOULD PROBABLY TEND TO BELITTLE WHATEVER OFFER WAS FIRST ADVANCED BY THE TURKS, BUT I EMPHASIZED THAT THE REAL TEST WOULD BE WHETHER THIRD PARTIES WOULD JUDGE THE TURKISH EFFORT AS A REASONABLE ONE. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS NOT JUST THE AMERICAN CONGRESS THAT EXPECTED PROGRESS. I POINTED OUT THAT MANY EUROPEAN NATIONS HAD BEEN HELPFUL BEHIND THE SCENES IN GETTING THE EMBARGO REMOVED, BUT THAT ALL OF TURKEY'S FRIENDS, WHETHER IN EUROPE OR AMERICA, NOW BELIEVED THE BALL WAS IN TURKEY'S COURT AND WERE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING A GOT INITIATIVE. FAILURE TO ACT AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT WOULD THEREFORE BE A SOURCE OF DIFFICULTY FOR TURKEY WITH ALL OF ITS FRIENDS, NOT JUST THE U.S. FINALLY I ELABORATED ON THE PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY'S FEELING THAT IT WOULD BE A WISE TACTIC TO ABANDON A ONE-STEP-AT-A-TIME NEGOTIATION AND INSTEAD DISCUSS THE POWERS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS AND REFUGEE RETURN SIMULTANEOUSLY.

3. ON THE SUBJECT OF OUR COMMON DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS (CDI), I ELABORATED ON THE PRESIDENT'S CONVICTION THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE SECURITY OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES TO GET THESE INSTALLATIONS REACTIVATED WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. I ELABORATED TOO ON THE POINT I MADE EARLIER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF KEEPING HIGHLY TRAINED TECHNICIANS IN A STATE OF IDLENESS. I NOTED THAT THE RESULT OF A CONTINUING SHUTDOWN WOULD BE THE EVACUATION OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL FROM

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 07730 01 OF 02 160629Z

THESE INSTALLATIONS -- THE VERY THING THAT BOTH THE GOVERNMENTS HAVE BATTLED FOR SO MANY MONTHS TO AVOID. I SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR PROVISIONAL STATUS PENDING THE WORKING OUT OF A NEW DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP BUT I EMPHASIZED THE ESSENTIALITY OF PROMPTLY FINDING SOME WAY UNDER THE PROVISIONAL STATUS TO GET THESE INSTALLATIONS BACK IN THE INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING BUSINESS.

4. AFTER I HAD COMPLETED THIS PRESENTATION DEMIREL WAS SILENT FOR ALMOST A MINUTE. HE THEN REREAD PORTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. FINALLY HE SAID, "AS I HAVE STRESSED TO YOU BEFORE, IT IS ALWAYS EASIER TO TEAR THINGS DOWN THAN TO PUT THEM BACK TOGETHER AGAIN. IT IS BECAUSE OF THIS THAT MY GOVERNMENT WORKED SO HARD TO AVOID ACTING AGAINST THE INSTALLATIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE." THERE WAS THEN ANOTHER SILENCE, AFTER WHICH HE SAID "IT IS VERY HARD. I DID NOT SPEAK OF THESE MATTERS IN THE CAMPAIGN BECAUSE THAT LEADS TO BECOMING COMMITTED AND LOSING" -- AND THEN HE FUMBLED FOR A MOMENT FOR THE PROPER ENGLISH WORD -- "MANEUVERABILITY." THE OPPOSITION, HE SIAD, HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT." TO THE TURKISH VOTERS THEY SPEAK OF THEIR CONQUEST OF CYPRUS, WHILE TO THE WORLD AUDIENCE THEY SPEAK OF THEIR PEACE OPERATION." THIS TACTIC MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT, HE SAID, TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM NOW. "YOU ALSO KNOW", HE ADDED, "OF MY OTHER PROBLEM" -- AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO THE HARDLINING

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 07730 02 OF 02 160630Z

12

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 124264

O R 160416Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1045

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 7730

EXDIS

ERBAKAN, HIS COALITION PARTNER. THEN, AFTER STILL ANOTHER PAUSE, HE SAID, "I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD PROPER FOR ME TO GIVE YOU AN ANSWER TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE NOW. ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT I WILL REVIEW IT CAREFULLY AND IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS I WILL BE TALKING WITH OTHERS WHO MUST BE PART OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. THEN ON THE 20TH--WHICH IS ONLY FIVE DAYS FROM NOW--I WILL BE DISCUSSING THE MATTER FORMALLY IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND A COUPLE OF DAYS THEREAFTER IN THE CABINET. UNTIL THIS PROCESS IS COMPLETED IT WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ME TO REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT I THINK YOU KNOW THAT I WILL DO ALL I CAN TO HELP U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS." AS THIS LATTER

REMARK WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR DISCUSSION OF THE CDI'S, I SAID THAT IT WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO SEIZE THIS MOMENT TO TRY TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE CYPRUS MATTER. HE SAID "YET, IF THAT IS POSSIBLE" BUT HE SAID IT IN A WAY TO SUGGEST THAT CYPRUS WAS, IN HIS VIEW, AN ALMOST INCURABLE PROBLEM. THIS LED TO MY GOING BACK AGAIN OVER WYH(#)

WE WERE CONVINCED THAT A CYPRUS SOLUTION WAS MORE POSSIBLE NOW THAT IT HAD BEEN IN THE PAST OR MIGHT BE AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. DEMIREL LISTENED ONCE MORE TO THESE ARGUMENTS BUT RESPONDED ONLY BY REPEATING THAT HE WOULD BE SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S POINTS WERE GIVEN MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AS THE GOVERNMENT MOVED TOWARD ITS DECISION.

5. A FEW MOMENTS LATER AS WERE WALKING TO THE DOOR, DEMIREL STOPPED TO MENTION THE POPPY PROBLEM. HE SAID HE WASNTED THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 07730 02 OF 02 160630Z

PRESIDENT TO KNOW THAT HE CONTINUED TO REMEMBER THE CONVERSATION THEY HAD ON THE SUBJECT IN HELSINKI AND THAT HE CONTINUED TO FEEL STRONGLY THAT POPPY CULTIVATION MUST BE CONTROLLED EFFECTIVELY. HE REMAINED DETERMINED HE SAID TO SEE THAT THIS WAS DONE. I RESPONDED THAT THE PRESIDENT, ON THE BASIS OF THE ASSURANCES HE HAD RECEIVED IN HELSINKI, HAD WORKED HARD TO SWITCH A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN WHO WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE OPIUM PROBLEM AND THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS EFFORT SEVERAL HAD IN FACT CHANGED THEIR VOTES ON OCTOBER 2.

6. A FEW HOURS AFTER MY MEETING WITH DEMIREL I SPOKE PRIVATELY WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT AT A DINNER MY WIFE AND I WERE HOSTING FOR THE DEPARTING DANISH AMBASSADOR. I TOLD ECEVIT THAT HIS OLD ASSOCIATE SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS COUNTING ON HIS HELP ON THE CYPRUS SITUATION IN THE CRITICAL WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. ECEVIT ASKED ME TO TELL THE SECRETARY THAT HE WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL. HE SAID "YOU CAN TEL DR. DISSINGER THAT I WILL SUPPORT THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES PROVIDED THEY DO NOT GO TO THE POINT WHERE THEY BECOME FOOLISH." HE ADDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD, OF COURSE, SAFELY START WITH THE OFFERS THAT HE HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN READY TO MAKE, AND HE ASKED ME WHETHER I THOUGHT DEMIREL WAS NOW GOING TO MAKE SOME MOVES ON THE CYPRUS SITUATION. I SAID IT WOULD BE ANOTHER WEEK OR TEN DAYS BEFORE WE WOULD KNOW AND COUNTERED BY ASKING HIM WHETHER, AS AN EXPERT ON ERBAKAN, HE THOUGHT THE LATTER WOULD BE MORE OR LESS AMENABLE AS A RESULT OF HIS SIGNIFICANT RECENT DEFEAT AT THE POLLS. ECEVIT SAID THAT THERE ARE NO EXPERTS ON ERBAKAN.

7. COMMENT: IT IS DEMIREL'S STYLE OFTEN TO BE ENIGMATIC, BUT I BELIEVE HE NOW FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION AS SEEN

BY THE USG AND THE LOGIC WHICH UNDERLIES THE POSITIONS WE ARE TAKING.
AS FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL ALSO UNDERSTANDS THIS
(ANKARA 7669), I DO NOT NOW THINK IT IS STILL NECESSARY
TO CALL IN ESENBEL TO GO OVER THE SAME GROUND. I CONTINUE
TO FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT A GENERAL HAIG DEMARCHE TO TURKISH
CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL SANCAR COULD RESULT IN
DEMIREL'S HAND BEING STRENGTHENED IN THE KEY DAYS LYING IMMEDIATELY
AHEAD.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 07730 02 OF 02 160630Z

8. AS FOR ECEVIT, HE BASICALLY CONTINUES TO TAKE THE POSITION
HE PUT FORWARD DURING THE SECRETARY'S LAST VISIT TO ANKARA.
THIS MEANS THAT ERBAKAN RATHER THAN ECEVIT IS
DEMIREL'S PROBLEM AS FAR AS AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTIAL TURKISH
FLEXIBILITY IS CONCERNED. ONCE GOT MOVES
GO BEYOND ECEVIT'S PLANNED "OPENERS", HOWEVER, DEMIREL
IS GOING TO HAVE ECEVIT TO WORRY ABOUT AS WELL. AS FOR
ERBAKAN, ECEVIT IS CORRECT ABOUT HIS UNPREDICTIBILITY. MOST
OBSERVERS HERE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE ALL
THE TROUBLE HE CAN AND THAT THE REAL QUESTION IS
WHETHER DEMIREL WILL FIND A WAY TO WORK AROUND HIM.
MACOMBER

NOTE BY OC/T: ANKARA 7730/2. (#)PARA 4 AS RECEIVED.
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

SECRET

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Margaret P. Grafeld
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